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Turner: Nonrecourse Liabilities as Tax Shelter Devices After Tufts: Elimi

NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES AS TAX SHELTER DEVICES AFTER
TUFTS: ELIMINATION OF FAIR MARKET VALUE AND
CONTINGENT LIABILITY DEFENSES
INTRODUCTION

Thirty-six years ago, the United States Supreme Court construed the term
"property" for purposes of determining the realized gain or loss under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.' In Crane v. Commissioner,2 the
Court ruled that "property" refers to physical property itself, or the owner's
rights to possess, use and dispose of it. The Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that property is synonymous with "equity," or the property's value in
excess of liens. The Court accordingly held that the taxpayer who sold encumbered real property had to include in amount realized the outstanding
balance of a mortgage.4 Because Crane involved real property encumbered by
a nonrecourse mortgage,5 investors quickly discovered that by using nonrecourse debts they could leverage investments by taking large deductions against
other sources of taxable income, outlaying minimal cash and avoiding the risk
of liability.6 Crane thus laid the foundation for the modern day tax shelter.7
To curb the expanding use of such tax shelters, the Commissioner retreated from his Crane position regarding nonrecourse debt. In the 1970s and
1980s, the IRS adopted internal programs to counter tax shelter abuse.s The
Service also successfully solicited a congressional alliance which resulted in
the adoption of the "at risk rules in 19769 and TEFRA in 1982.10 In addition
1. The applicable provisions of the Code include Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 111(a)
(gain or loss); 111(b) (amount realized); 113(a)(5) (carryover basis from decedent); 113(b)
(adjusted basis); 114(a) (depreciable basis), 52 Stat. 484, 484, 490, 493, 494 (current versions
at I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1001(b), 1014(a), 1011, 167(g) (1982)).

2.

331 U.S. 1 (1947).

3.

Id. at 7.

4. Id. at 13.
5. A nonrecourse debt is a debt in which the borrower is not personally liable. Upon
default the lender looks solely to the underlying secured property for satisfaction. Dailey &
Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate Tax Shelter: The Tax Reform Scalpel, 55 TAXES 127, 139
(1977). Real property may be acquired by incurring a nonrecourse debt when (1) a third
party lends purchase funds and secures the debt with the purchased property; (2) the vendor
carries back a purchase-money mortgage; and (3) the vendee assumes or takes subject to existing mortgage. Drye, The Income Tax Effect of Mortgages, 17 WASH. 9- LEE L. REV. 1, 3
(1960); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498,
1498 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Federal Tax Treatment].
6. Calkins & Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAw. 493, 507 (1973).
7. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277, 283
(1978).
8. See Testimony of Roscoe Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives
(Sept. 28, 1982), IR-82-111, 9 Fed. Taxes (P-H) (1982) 1 55,315, at 55,506, reprinted in 68
A.B.A. J. 1674 (1982); 17 TAX NoTEs 65 (Oct. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Egger].
9. 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 465 (1982)).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
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to these congressional and administrative actions, the IRS has taken court
action against flagrant uses of nonrecourse liability." Generally, the Service
asserts a two-pronged attack against nonrecourse debt: first, the amount of the
debt must reasonably approximate the value of the property; and second, unless the facts indicate the nonrecourse loan most likely will be repaid, the loan
is considered too contingent for inclusion in basis .12
Although the nonrecourse mortgage balance in Crane was less than the
property's value," in footnote 37 the Court implied a different result might
be reached when the balance of the mortgage exceeds the value of the secured
property.1 4 Recently, in Commissioner v. Tufts,15 the taxpayer relied on footnote 37 in arguing that the unpaid balance of a nonrecourse loan should be
included in amount realized upon disposition only to the extent of the property's value.:6 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Commissioner
that the Crane doctrine required including the entire unpaid balance of the
loan in amount realized, even when the loan exceeds the property's fair market
value.'7 Although the Court recognized that nonrecourse debt in some situations may be considered contingent, this position is inconsistent with the
Crane view that nonrecourse debt should be treated the same as recourse debt
8
since each is deemed a true loan.1
The ultimate significance of Tufts may be in the Court's reasoning rather
than its holding. Such reasoning may undermine, if not overturn, the Commissioner's dual-pronged test for determining whether nonrecourse debt is
included in basis. This article first examines Crane and the tax shelter enabled
by that decision. Next, the article traces judicial, legislative and administrative
attempts to curb tax shelters involving nonrecourse debt from the time of Crane
until the Tufts decision. Finally, the Tufts case and its effect on the Commissioner's fair market value and contingent liability defenses are analyzed.
This article concludes that Tufts appears to limit these defenses and thus may
prompt a revival of tax shelters.
NONRECOURSE DEBT AND

TAX SHELTERS IN THE AFTERMATH

or Crane

19

In Crane, the taxpayer inherited an apartment building subject to a nonrecourse mortgagePO She operated the apartment for many years, taking depredation on the property's total basis undiminished by the nonrecourse

11. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

331 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 14 n.37.
103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
Id. at 1829-30.
Id.

.18. .d. at n.5.
19. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). For further discussion of the facts in Crane, see Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and.Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REv. 3,
5-10 (1980).
20. 331 U.S. at 3 n.1.
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loan. 21 Threatened with foreclosure, she sold the property for a small cash pay22
ment with the buyer taking subject to the mortgage.
The taxpayer argued that the amount realized on this sale was equal to the
cash received because the "property" sold was merely her equity interest. Although the buyer took subject to the nonrecourse mortgage, the taxpayer contended that discharge of this debt for which she was not personally liable was
of no benefit to her and thus did not constitute a gain. The Commissioner
disagreed and claimed the amount realized on the sale was the value of the
property undiminished by the nonrecourse mortgage. 23 The Commissioner
computed the gain by adding the outstanding balance of the loan to the cash
received and subtracting the property's original basis as reduced by depreciation.
In resolving the dispute, the Supreme Court distinguished "equity" and
"property" by examining the meaning of "property" as it is used for determining basis. 24 If basis included merely the equity value of property, depreciation would sometimes have to be taken against a negative basis or disallowed
entirely. 25 Additionally, depreciation against an equity basis would require repeated redetermination of depreciation against a constantly changing reduced
basis. The Court agreed with the Commissioner that such a result would place
an overwhelming accounting burden on the IRS and the taxpayer.2 6 The Court
concluded that the proper basis for determining either depreciation, gain or
loss, or the amount realized is the value of the property undiminished by the
27
nonrecourse mortgage.
Crane left several issues unresolved which troubled courts28 and commentators. 29 The property in Crane was acquired by inheritance and disposed of by
30
sale, and at neither time was its value less than the nonrecourse mortgage.
There was much speculation over whether the Crane doctrine extended to
property acquired other than by inheritance, such as by purchase when basis
is determined by cost, not fair market value. 31 Because the Crane Court ap21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 9-10.
26. Id. at 6-10.
27. Id. at 11.
28. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. Rav. 159, 159-60 (1966); Bittker, supra note 7, at
278-85; Comment, Depreciation of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage: Implications
of the Crane Decision, 26 Tax. L. REv. 796, 805-06 (1948).
30. 331 U.S. at 3-4.
31. See Adams, supra note 29, at 159 ("[i]t is still not entirely clear whether the rule of
the Crane case is applicable when property is acquired by purchase rather than by inheritance"). Compare Comment, 33 IOWA L. REv. 143, 148 n.27 (1947) (Crane may be limited
to situations involving inheritances) with Comment, supra note 29, at 805 ("[a] logical extension of the Crane doctrine would be [to include] property acquired by purchase"); and
Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be The Cost of Such Property: How is Cost Defined?. 3 TAX L. REv. 351, 355 (1948) (Crane doctrine equally applicable to purchase or exchange).
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parently assumed taxpayers would continue futlfilling mortgage conditions to
protect a positive equity interest,32 many questioned Crane's applicability in
cases where the mortgage balance exceeds the property's value. 33 Despite this
uncertainty regarding the doctrine's scope, all agreed Crane permitted a tremendous potential tax shelter for a high tax bracket taxpayer.3 4
Limited Partnershipsas Tax Shelters
The essence of a tax shelter is to generate current losses within the first
years of investment and thus insulate an investors other income from tax.3 5
The importance of Crane for investors was its decision that nonrecourse debt
3 6
must be included in the basis of property subject to depreciation. The taxpayer is allowed a current deduction for a noncash expense depreciation.Y
Because the taxpayer is not personally liable for the nonrecourse debt, the
burden of depreciation in excess of the taxpayer's investment is borne by the
lender and only potentially by the taxpayer should the property generate
profit.33 The Crane doctrine and depreciation rules thus interacted to allow
full deductions with minimal risk,39 laying the foundation for a number of tax
Many commentators also queried whether Crane would apply to nonsale dispositions,
such as abandonments, transfers in cancellation of indebtness, and charitable donations. See,
e.g., Adams, supra note 29, at 160; Meyer, Disposition of Real Estate Where Mortgage Indebtedness Exceeds "Tax Basis", 7TH ANN. N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX'N 338, 339-48 (1949). See
generally Spears, Mortgages in Excess of Basis, 1959 S. CAL. TAX INsT. 883, 889-98.

32. 331 U.S. at 14. See Federal Tax Treatment, supra note 5, at 1501.
33. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing,118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 84-86 (1969); Perry, Limited
Partnershipsand Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAx L. REv. 525, 528-29

(1972). Cf. Braunfeld, Subject To a Mortgage (pt. 3), 25 TAXES 155, 156 (1947) (the depreciation deduction is dependent only upon the cost, and is quite independent of the value of the
secured property at time of acquisition or thereafter).
34. E.g., Bittker, supra note 7, at 283; Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719,
719 (1975); Perry, supra note 33, at 526-30.
35. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HAZY. L. REv. 309,
379 n.123 (1972). See also Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 719 ("A tax shelter, at its simplest, is
an investment that succeeds in generating a mismatching of income and deductions: the
deductions now; the income, like sermons and soda water, the morning after."); Newman,
The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 "WAKE FoR'sr L. Rxv. 1 (1982)
(gives examples of various forms of tax shelters); Perry, supra note 33, at 536 n.44 (setting
forth various problems in defining a tax shelter). The term "tax shelter" only recently has
been accepted in general usage among courts, the Service and commentators. See Shefsky,
Take the Helter Out of Shelter, 58 TAxEs 299, 299-300 (1980).
36. See Drye, supra note 5, at 17 ("[t]he most important outgrowth of the Crane case
is that it permits a taxpayer to secure at. a relatively low out-of-pocket cost a high depreciation basis"); Perry, supra note 33, at 527 ("the purchase and sale of nondepreciable, nondepletable property is unaffected by Crane'.
37. See Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 771 (1973). See also McKee, Partnership
Allocations in Real Estate Ventures: Crane, Kresser and Orrisch, 30 TAX L. REv. 1, 1 (1974).
38. McKee, supra note 37, at 3-4.
39. Bittker, supra note 7, at 283. One commentator suggested that the tax shelter benefits may lie more with the depreciation rules than with Crane. McKee, supra note 37, at 2 n.6;
McKee. The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Exposd, 57 VA. L. Rxv. 521, 534-35
(1971) (the difference between actual economic and tax depreciation provides real estate investors a tax shelter).
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shelters in the 1960s and 1970s.40
Most popular among the various forms of investment structures available
for tax shelters is the limited partnership.41 An amalgam of specialized state
statutory law and federal income tax law'42 the limited partnership has attributes of both general partnerships and corporations. 43 Four features combine to make the limited partnership the preferred mode for tax shelter investment. First, limited liability permits persons to combine resources for
investment purposes while limiting their losses to assets committed to the
venture.44 Second, taxpayers may take current deductions for depreciation
without cash expenditure.45 This together with a third factor, Crane's inclusion
of nonrecourse debt in depreciable basis, permits the taxpayer substantial
depreciation deductions which greatly exceed any economic investment. 46
Thus, huge sums of capital may be accumulated which, together with funds
borrowed on a nonrecourse basis, may be invested in projects that generate
tremendous amounts of depreciation deductions. Fourth, because depreciation
deductions are incurred at the entity level, limited partnerships are particularly
attractive as tax shelters. Unlike a corporation, a partnership is not a separate
taxpaying entity47 the partnership's taxable income-8 is passed through to the
partners who report the income and losses in their individual capacities. 4 9 Con-

40. See generally Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That Wore No Clothes, 28
TAx L. REV. 355 (1973); McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax Shelter,
3 J. REAL EST. T. 439 (1976); Wangard, Use of Nonrecourse Loans in Tax Planning: The
Possibilitiesand Pitfalls,39 J. TAX'N 286 (1973).
41. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4072-73; Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine To Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 100 (1972); Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 719-20; Kanter, Real Estate
Tax Shelters, 51 TAxEs 770, 786 (1973). For other forms of tax sheltering organizations, see
Greenberg, Forms of Organizationfor Holding and Developing Real Estate, 29TH ANN. N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX'N 1129, 1134-57 (1971); Kanter, supra at 771; Rabinowitz, Realty Syndication:
An Income Tax Primerfor Investor and Promoter,29 J. TAX'N 92, 92 (1968).
42. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 196 Kan. 274, 411 P.2d 591, 598 (1966) (limited partnerships were unknown at common law); Danoff v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Pa.
1976) (limited partnership has unique position under federal tax law), See generally Rhodes,
Real Estate Limited Partnerships:Selected Tax Considerations, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 346, 352-55
(1977). Limited partnership interests are also securities under federal securities law, Frazier
v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1981), and thus promoters must comply with the
requirements of the Security and Exchange Commission. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640 (9th
Cir. 1980); 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982).
43. See, e.g., Vulcan Furniture Mfg., Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1964) (failure to file annual report and secure renewal certificate results in loss of limited
partnership status).
44. Epstein, supra note 41, at 100.
45. McKee, supra note 37, at 1. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982). In this respect, tax deductions
differ from the actual economic depreciation of assets. McKee, supra note 39, at 534-35. See
supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
46. Epstein, supra note 41, at 101-03; McKee, supra note 37, at 2.
47. I.R.C. § 701 (1982).
48. See id. § 703(a).
49. Id. §§ 701-702(a). See generally Davies, The Administrative Assault Upon the Real
Estate Tax Shelter, 54 TAXES 505, 5(6-08 (1976).
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sequently, limited partners may use the partnership's depreciation deductions
to offset other personal income and thereby shelter that income from tax.5 0
A limited partner is not, however, automatically entitled to use the depreciation deductions incurred by the limited partnership. Under the Code's
scheme, such deductions may not exceed the adjusted basis of the partner's
interest in the limited partnership.51 The adjusted basis is generally equal to
the sum of money and the adjusted basis of property contributed by the
53
partner to the partnership, 52 adjusted to reflect partnership operations. Most
importantly for tax shelter purposes, a partner's basis is increased by his share
of nonrecourse liabilities incurred by the partnership. 54 The regulations incorporate the Crane doctrine by providing that when no partner is personally
liable for a partnership obligation, all partners, including limited partners,
share in that liability.55 Partners share partnership liabilities in the same ratio
that they share partnership profits, ostensibly on the theory that the liability
will be repaid from income derived from the property5 6
To shelter income, the limited partnership invests capital contributions
from partners and funds from nonrecourse borrowing in depreciable assets.
Because Crane permits including the nonrecourse debt in basis, large depredation deductions in excess of actual capital may be taken. In addition, the
regulations allow limited partners to increase their adjusted basis in the partnership interest by their respective shares of nonrecourse debt. 5r Thus when
the depreciation deductions are passed through to the limited partners, they
can take the deductions against other income and are not limited by their
equity interest. All the while the limited partners are protected by limited
58
liability.

50. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 100; McKee, supranote 37, at 1.
51. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982). Any loss deductions not allowed in a year are carried over to
subsequent taxable years until basis is increased. Id.

52. Id. § 722.
53. Id. § 705(a).
54. Id. § 752(a). See Rhodes, supra note 42, at 352-55.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). See S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 4071-72; Frank E. Sellers, 36 T.C.M. 305, 318
n.14 (1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1979); Rhodes, supranote 42, at 353 n.41.
56. McKee, supranote 37, at 26.
57. Technically, the adjusted basis in the partnership interest is not directly increased
by the nonrecourse debt. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956), the limited partners share
in partnership nonrecourse obligations. Section 752(a) treats this as a contribution of money
and sections 705(a) and 722 combine to provide that the contribution of money increases the
basis in the partnership interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1956) provides that such contribution may be made either to a new or existing partnership. See McKee, supra note 37, at 26
M.46.
58. See'Epstein, supra note 41, at 100. Additional tax benefits may be granted to the
limited partners if the partnership agreement contains special provisions allocating additional depredation deductions to them above their profit share. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1982).
However, any such, allocation must have substantial economic effect. Id; Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2) Ex. (5) (1956). But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 ("Allocations of loss or deduction (or item thereof) attributable to nonrecourse debt which is secured
by partnership property do not have substantial economic effect since the creditor bears the
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Assault on Tax Shelters NotwithstandingCrane
The income sheltering potential afforded by limited partnerships after the
9
Crane decision motivated the IRS to take steps to curb tax shelter abuse.
6°
Early post-Crane cases quickly established the battlelines between the IRS
and taxpayer in disputes over the issues left unresolved by Crane. Recent
legislative enactment of at risk rules and other statutory succor have aided the
Commissioner's attack against tax shelters and nonrecourse debt. In conjunction with this judicial and legislative action, the Commissioner began a direct
administrative attack in the 1970s.
Judicial Development
To limit the revenue decreasing implications of Crane, the IRS successfully argued in a series of cases that contingent or indefinite nonrecourse debt
6
cannot be included in the basis of property.6 ' In Redford v. Commissioner,
for example, the taxpayer gave a note as partial payment for the purchase of
property.6 3 This note was payable solely from future profits and would become
null and void if the lender breached an ancillary agreement between the
parties.6 4 Because future profits were uncertain, the tax court refused to permit
economic burden of any losses attributable thereto. Thus such allocations must be made in
accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership.").
59. Because limited partnerships are given such a favored treatment in the tax law,
courts and the Service have strictly construed regulation § 1.752-1(e) allowing inclusion of
nonrecourse debt in the basis of the partnership interests of the limited partners, and have
rejected various schemes by taxpayers to take advantage of the provision while even further
limiting potential liability. See, e.g., Danoff v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 20, 23 (M.D. Pa.
1979); Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 C.B. 184 (idemnity agreement by a limited partner idemnifying loss of a general partner does not increase basis of partnership interest of limited
partner). See also Block v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 546, 552 (1980); Brown v. Commissioner,
40 T.C.M. 725, 731-34 (1980), afJ'd, 51 A.F.T.R.2d 83-348 (9th Cir. 1983) (guaranty agreement
from limited partner to creditor does not increase basis of partnership interest of limited
partner); Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200 ("nonrecourse loan" made by general partner
does not increase basis of partnership interest of limited partner); see also Backar v. Western
States Producing Co., 547 F.2d 876, 880 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977); Gibson Prod. Co. v. United
States, 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1978), afJ'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981) ("nonrecourse loan" made by third party does not increase basis of partnership interest of limited
partner); Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 C.B. 394. For a similar treatment concerning a general
partner, see Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 415 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (alleged "nonrecourse
loan" from limited partners); Danoff v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 20, 23 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(basis of limited partner in partnership interest dependent upon "limited partner-general
partner-creditor relationship").
60. Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (Crane extended to foreclosure
of mortgage exceeding basis); Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949),
acq. 1949-2 C.B. 1 (Crane applied in purchase context).
61. See Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834, 849 (1964), aff'd per
curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966); Albany Car Wheel Co. v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831, 841 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Redford
v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773, 778 (1957). See also Las Vegas Land & Water Co., 26 T.C. 881,
885 (1956); Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 C.B. 567. See generally Del Cotto, supra note 33, at 79-82.
62. 28 T.C. 773 (1957).
63. Id. at 775. The property inxolved was a nondepreciable tract of land. Id.
64. Id. at 776.
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the obligation to be included in basis.6 5 Subsequent cases similarly disallowed
a loan's inclusion in basis when the amount of payments was too speculative
to determine with any degree of certainty.66
In an attempt to further restrict the situations in which nonrecourse debt
could be included in basis, the Commissioner argued that the Crane doctrine
should be limited to cases involving property acquired by inheritance or devise.
The court in Manuel D. Mayerson,67 however, refused to adopt the Commissioner's contention. In that case, the taxpayer purchased depreciable real property with a purchase-money note secured solely by the property. Under the
agreement, the taxpayer could either prepay the note within the first two years
and realize a sizable reduction in price or pay within ninety-nine years from
the date of sale. 68 The IRS disallowed the taxpayer's claimed depreciation,69
positing that the nonrecourse purchase-money mortgage was not includible in
0
depreciable basis.7
Although Crane involved inherited property, the basis of which is its fair
market value, the Mayerson court held Crane applicable when property is
purchased and its basis is its cost. Noting that lack of personal liability accorded with common business practices,7 1 the court decided a taxpayer purchasing property on a nonrecourse basis should be treated similarly to one
purchasing property unencumbered or with recourse debt. The court reasoned
that the taxpayer who finances with a nonrecourse mortgage is effectively given
an advance credit for the mortgage amount.72 The court assumed that a capital
investment in the amount of the mortgage would eventually occur despite the
lack of personal liability. 73
The Commissioner conceded defeat on the "purchase" issue,74 but in
Revenue Ruling 69-7775 sternly cautioned taxpayers that the value of the
mortgaged property was not at issue in Mayerson. Because Crane expressly
declined to decide the issue, the Commissioner stated he would continue to
counter inclusion of nonrecourse obligations in basis when the obligation
exceeded the property's fair market value.7 6 The Commissioner emphasized
65. Id. at 778.

66. See, e.g., Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963); aff'd per curiam,
333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964), which involved the purchase of business assets and an assumption
of the seller's severance pay liability to its employees under a union contract. The court
disallowed the liability's inclusion in basis because the buyer's payment was too "speculative."
Id. at 841. See also Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964), aJJ'd per
curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966). This contingent liability
defense will be addressed more fully infra at notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
67. 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
68. Id. at 342.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id. at 351.
71.

Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 351-52.
1969-1 C.B. 21.
1969-1 C.B. 59.

.

76. Crane's footnote 37 suggested that a different result might be reached in determining
amount realized when the securd property's value is less than the remaining balance on the
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that Mayerson could not be relied upon in future cases unless the property
was acquired in a bona fide, arm's length purchase at fair market value, and
the nonrecourse loan was it bona fide debt obligation. 77 The Commissioner
also warned that the IRS would be vigilant against any attempt by taxpayers
to inflate purported purchases of property to take advantage of depreciation
deductions.78
The Commissioner's view later received judicial sanction in Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner.- That case involved a classic tax shelter of depreciable real property purchased by a limited partnership.80 The limited
partners took depreciation deductions on the full purchase price, including
the nonrecourse note, and interest deductions on the monthly installments.,1
The Commissioner disallowed these deductions on the grounds that the entire
transaction was a sham because the taxpayers did not show that the property's
82
value approximated the purchase price.
The court upheld the IRS's position because the taxpayers had not met
their "burden" of showing the purchase price did not exceed the fair market
value of the property.83 To substantiate a "sale" involving nonrecourse debt,
the court required proof that the purchase price was reasonably equal to the
fair market value so that the buyer would soon realize an equity in the property.8 4 The court apparently adopted Crane's assumption that a prudent purchaser with equity would not abandon payments on the note and subject the
property to foreclosure. 85 Following the "spirit" of Revenue Ruling 69-77, the
court denied interest deductions on the grounds that absent a showing of
property value, nonrecourse debt is not to be treated as a bona fide obligation.8 6
In sum, the courts endorsed a two-pronged attack by the Commissioner
against nonrecourse debt. First, unless the nonrecourse loan will almost certainly be repaid, the loan is considered too contingent or speculative for innonrecourse mortgage. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37. Because the Supreme Court found a "functional
relation" between the Code's treatment of amount realized and depreciation, id. at 12, footnote 37 also suggested an argument for a difference in determining depreciable basis should
the value be less than the balance of the nonrecourse debt.
77. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59.
78. Id.
79. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. Id. at 1046.
81. Id. at 1046.
82. Id. at 1046, 1048. The Commissioner also argued that in substance the transaction
merely amounted to an option. Id. at 1046. This argument was successful with the Tax
Court, 64 T.C. 752, 771 (1975), but the appellate court chose instead to rest its holding on
the fair market value defense. 544 F.2d at 1047.
83. Id. at 1048, 1048 n.4, 1049. Although the question of value was raised at trial, sufficient evidence was not presented, and the court did not believe remand was warranted. Id.
at 1046 n.4.
84. Id. at 1048.
85. Id. The court asserted that under the facts it was unnecessary to decide the tax
consequences should the fair market value of the property subsequently increase and yield
an equity interest. Id. at 1048-49. The court proposed the consequences may involve determining the proper basis of the property at the date the equity interest commenced. Id. at
1049 n.5.
86. Id. at 1049, 1049 n.6.
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clusion in basis. Second, the debt amount must reasonably approximate the
secured property's value before it may be included in basis.
Congressional Action
Not only did the courts aid in the Commissioner's attempts to limit the
scope of Crane, but Congress later offered additional assistance in the fight
against tax shelters. In passing the "at risk" rules of the Tax Reform Act of
1976,87 Congress expressly sought to eliminate the use of nonrecourse leveraging in limited partnership tax shelters.88 These rules limit annual deductible
losses for an activity 9 to the aggregate amount for which the taxpayer is personally economically at risk.90 Most importantly, the taxpayer is not considered
at risk with respect to nonrecourse financing. 91 The 1976 Act was aimed at four
traditional tax shelter activities: farming, oil and gas exploration, operations
relating to motion picture films or video tapes, and equipment leasing. 92 The
at risk rules virtually eliminated the attractiveness of these activities because
investors could no longer limit liability and still obtain large tax write-offs. 9
Congress and the Department of Treasury quickly discovered the at risk
rules had not gone far enough in battling tax shelters. 94 In an effort to stymie
increasing tax shelter activity,9 5 Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 197896
which extended the at risk rules to all activities except real estate. 97 Although
87. 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 465 (1982)).
88. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976); Rhodes, supra note 42, at 347-48; Sax,
Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX LAw. 5, 10 (1980).

89. I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (1982); S. RE. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.NEWS 3439, 3483.
90. See I.R.C. § 465(a) (1982).
91. Id. § 465(b)(4).
92. S.REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 3439, 3483.
93. See generally Comment, Nonrecourse Liabilities: A Tax Shelter, 29 BAYLOR L. Ray.
57 (1977).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7046, 7104-05; Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where
Are You Now?, 53 S.CAL. L. REv. 1, 68-69 (1979).
95. Simmons, supra note 94, at 68.

96. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) [hereinafter cited at 1978 Act].
97. I.R.C. §§ 465(c)(3)(A), (D) (Supp. II 1978); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE RFVENUE Acr OF 1978, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-32 (official print. 1979).
Congress identified' three types of tax shelter problems remaining from the 1976 Act, whichthe 1978 Act attempted to address. The first problem was that only four activities were
directly covered by the at risk rules, and this was solved by extending the rules to all but real
estate activities. Id. The remaining two problems were that the at risk rules did not apply to
closely held corporations, and that the rules did not adequately deal with situations where
the taxpayer received distributions after having used his at risk basis to support losses in a
prior year. Id. at 130. These issues were resolved by extending the at risk provisions to
closely held corporations, through I.R.C. § 465(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978), and by requiring
recapture of losses through I.R.C. § 465(e) (1982). Id. at 134-146; Sax, supra note 88, at 10.
In addition, for the first time attention was directly focused on partnership level compliance,
a penalty was imposed for failure to file the partnership return, see I.R.C. § 6698 (Supp. II
1978), and the statute of limitations was extended for federally registered partnerships. Id.

§§ 6501(q), 6511(g).
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directed at curbing misuse of tax shelters, the 1976 Act and 1978 Revenue Act
may have actually exacerbated the problem. While investors could be reasonably assured of advantageous results prior to the legislation, afterwards neither
leverage nor deductions could be readily obtained.9 8 Rather than offering investment devices with economic substance, promoters turned to abusive schemes
structured solely for tax benefits. 99
To counteract the abuses, Congress shifted emphasis away from purely
substantive tax shelter areas by enacting two tax acts with important administrative provisions. Due to various factors retarding economic growth, attitudes
changed and Congress debated long-range tax reductions for the first time in
recent history.100 The result. was enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA),ol a multi-year program designed to upgrade the nation's
industrial base and stimulate productivity while decreasing taxes and governmental spending.10 2 Because the mainspring of ERTA was economic stimulation, not tax reform, it offered an interesting array of changes. Drastic remodeling of depreciation rules facilitated tax shelter usage; whereas the cap
on individual income tax rates, extension of the at risk rules to investment tax
credit 103 and a new civil penalty for understating taxes due to overvaluing
104
property tended to impede shelter usage.
With a renewed commitment to raising revenue and achieving tax equity, 0 5
Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA).106 TEFRA also reflected Congress' increasing concern regarding tax
shelters. Responding to the lack of specific Code provisions relating to tax
shelter promoters, TEFRA furnished two new administrative weapons: a civil
penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters premised on unattainable tax benefits or gross valuation overstatement, '1 7 and injunctive authority to prevent
any action which may give rise to the civil penalty. 0 In addition, TEFRA

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Sax, supra note 88, at 10-11.
See Egger, supra note 8, at 55,506.
Briner, Economic Recovery Tax of 1981, 15 AKRON L. REV. 325, 325 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
STAFF OF JOINT COMm. oF TAXATION, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 20, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (official print 1981).
103. See I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (1982).
104. See I.R.C. §6659 (1982).
105.
BILITY

SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON H.R. 4961, TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSI-

ACT OF 1982, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-97, reprinted in FED. TAXES (P-H) (1982),

59,547

(Rep. B. 31, Vol. LXIII (Sec. 2) (July 15, 1982)). In a sense, TEFRA represented a reversal of

the movement begun by ERTA to reduce taxes. For example, a drastic shift from ERTA occurred in the area of "safe-harbor leasing", with TEFRA's addition of new section 168(i)
and amendment to section 168(f)(8).

106. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
107. I.R.C. § 6700 (1982).
108. Id. § 7408. These sanctions supplement other potential civil, or criminal, penalties
which may be imposed under certain circumstances. I.R.C. §§ 6694, 7206(2) (1976). See generally Sokoly & Miner, Continuing Attack Against Abusive Tax Shelters and Questionable
Reporting Positions: New Penalties for Promoters, Tax Advisors and Taxpayers, 57 J. TAx'N
288 (1982).
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imposed a penalty upon tax shelter investors who substantially underpay
taxes.109
Administrative Attack
To supplement judicial and congressional action, the IRS adopted internal
programs in the 1970s and early 1980s to counter tax shelter abuse. The Commissioner launched his first major-0 anti-tax shelter campaign in 1973 with the
announcement of several new strict policies."' First, the IRS stepped-up its
audit program examining partnership level information returns involving tax
shelters.12 The program initially focused on the oil and gas industry,"' and
was subsequently extended to real estate, farming and motion picture shelters." 4 Second, the Commissioner instituted a program of preannounced revenue.rulings directed at specific tax shelter arrangements." 5
In early 1974, the IRS set forth its view of the tax consequences when a
limited partner sold or exchanged partnership interest or withdrew from a
partnership which had nonrecourse debt.:"" In 1975, the IRS ruled that a
limited partner recognized gain on the transfer of partnership interest to a
109. I.R.C. § 6661 (1982).
110. Precursors to the Commissioner's virulent attack are found in early revenue rulings.
In Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, the Service expressed dismay at "certain abuses which
had arisen with respect to prepayment of interest by taxpayers" using the cash method, and
revoked an earlier ruling that interest prepayment may not result in income for the taxable
year of prepayment. 1968-2 C.B. at 77. Additionally, two revenue rulings involving nonrecourse loans made to oil and gas limited partnerships held that the loans should be treated
as capital contributions for tax purposes, thereby disallowing any increase in the limited
partner's basis in the partnership. Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200; Rev. Rul 72-350, 1972-2
C.B. 394. For discussion of the effect of nonrecourse debt on the basis of a limited partner's
interest in a partnership, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
111. See Egger, supra note 8, at 55,507. The Service announced that it would instigate a
program of audits and advanced rulings aimed against so-called "abusive" tax shelters.
Schlenger, Comments on the Proposed Regulations on Tax Shelters Opinions, 59 TAXES 173,
173 (1981) (announcement by acting Commissioner Alexander, at the Cleveland Tax Institute (Nov. 15, 1973)). The Administration earlier in the year had presented its viewpoint
about tax shelters to the House Ways and Means Committee, as part of the total input
received by Congress leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
112. See Sax, supra note 88, at 14. Since the partnership is not a taxable entity under
I.R.C. § 701 (1982), it previously had not been an independent audit target. Partnerships
were typically audited only as a result of an investigation of an individual's return, Sax, supra
note 88, at 14. Recently, TEFRA enacted legislation providing for a unified partnership
audit proceeding. See I.R.C. §§ 6221-32, 6511(g), 74 22(g), 7485(b) (1982).
113. See Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelters, 55 TAXES 774, 774
(1977). The IRS combined resources with the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission
in an effort to identify audit targets. Id.
Since tax shelter limited partnerships are treated as securities, the Federal Securities and
Exchange Commission also has a direct interest in the ongoings in the tax shelter industry.
See supra note 42; see also Shefsky, Publicly Offered Shelters: Can the SEC and the IRS be
Served, 53 TAxEs 516 (1975) (discusses a potential conflict between compliance with SEC and
IRS rules).
-114; Kurtz, suprfanote 113, at 774.
115. See Sax, supra note 83, at 11-12.
116. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159.
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charitable organization when his share of the partnership's nonrecourse debt
exceeded his basis in the interest.'n The third and final facet of the IRS's
anti-tax shelter program was to increase court action against uses of nonrecourse
liability in contexts dissimilar to the Crane situation.118

Although the IRS was successful in making some inroads into the tax
shelter area, the administrative effort received necessary assistance from both
Congress and the courts in 1976.111 Congress passed the at risk rules and other
legislation120 targeted against specific shelter characteristics of tax deferral such
as conversion of ordinary in to capital gain and leveraging through nonrecourse
loans.121 Judicial assistance came with Estate of Franklin,122 which required a
taxpayer to show that the property's purchase price at least approximates its
fair market value before the taxpayer could take a deduction attributable to
nonrecourse debt.123
Buoyed by this legislative and judicial action, the IRS began an even more
aggressive attack on tax shelters. The auditing program, which instigated tat
shelter review as a regular part of the examination format, went beyond the
former selective approach. 124 Additionally, improved communication methods
were established among the SEC, state securities agencies, and IRS district
and regional offices. Finally, the Service printed an examination handbook to
apprise field agents of tax shelter industry terminology and operations.125
The IRS soon realized that although the 1976 Act eliminated many forms
of tax shelters, promoters found novel means of investment and unusual business entities to slip through the legislative bindings. 12 To counter these new
tax shelter devices, the Commissioner adopted an innovative program in which
revenue rulings were specifically tailored for certain tax shelter arrangements
and were strategically announced for maximum coverage. 27 In one of those
rulings, Revenue Ruling 77-1 10,128 the Commissioner used for the first time the
dual-pronged defense of fair market value and contingent liability. That ruling
117. Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80.
118. This court action was successful, as the Commissioner's contingent liability defense
was accepted by the Court of Claims. See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
119. Schlenger, supra note 111, at 174.
120. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
121. Sax, supra note 88, at 9.
122.

544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this decision, see supra notes 79-86

and accompanying text.
123. 544 F.2d at 1048-49.
124. Kurtz, supra note 113, at 774-75.
125. Id. at 775. See Internal Revenue Service, No. 4326, Examination Tax Shelters Handbook 1-160 Index Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (1979) ff 300 (current version Index Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (1983) 300) [current version hereinafter cited as Handbook].
126.

Kurtz, supra note 113, at 774, 776.

127. Sax, supra note 88, at 11. In 1977, the Service issued a series of thirteen rulings, nine
of which were issued on October 31, and thus are referred to as the "Halloween Massacre"
rulings, see Schlenger, supra note 111, at 175. These rulings addressed various shelter arxangements to give "guidance to investors who might otherwise be misled as to the IRS
position." See Kurtz, supra note 113, at 776. For a list of the Halloween rulings, see Sax,
supra note 88, at 11 n.41.
128. 1977-1 C.B. 58.
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expressly adopted Estate of Franklin, and declared a partnership must demonstrate that the purchased property's value approximates the nonrecourse debt,
before including the amount of the note in basis for depreciation129 The
Commissioner further stated that if payment on the note is speculative, the
note amount cannot be included in basis. 30 This dual-prolonged defense has
since been used as the primary judicial weapon against nonrecourse debt and
tax shelters.
In another attempt to curb new tax shelter devices, the Commissioner
focused on professional tax advisors. A principal item in a tax shelter promotional package is an alleged tax expert's opinion letter which attests to representations concerning the prospective investor's tax benefit.131 Recognizing
that illfounded claims within these opinions contribute to tax shelter abuses, 132
in 1980 the IRS turned its attention to the authors of tax opinions. 3 3 The
Treasury Department proposed amendments to Circular 230, the rules governing attorneys' practice before the IRS.134 The amendments deal specifically
with tax shelter opinions and set forth standards for practice and disbarment.135
STATUS OF NONRECOURSE DEBT AT THE TIME OF Tufts

Testifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee in late September 1982, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue depicted the tax shelter industry as no longer a business where promoters merely "stretched" the law in
marketing deductions. Instead, as a result of the congressional, judicial and
administrative attempts to curb their use, the tax shelter industry now in129. The Commissioner's test apparently compared the property's fair market value to
the amount of the nonrecourse note. The court in Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1045, compared the property's fair market value to the property's purchase price.

130. 1977-1 C.B. at 59.
131. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1981); New York State
Bar Association Tax Section, Report of the Tax Section Executive Committee on the Treasury's Proposed Amendment to Circular 230 and Standards Applicable to Tax Opinions Used
in Offering Tax Shelter Investments, (pt. 1) 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 202, 202 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Tax].
132. See American Bar Association Section of Taxation Statement on Proposed Rule
Amending Circular230 with respect to Tax Shelter Opinions,34 TAx L w. 745, 745 (1981).
133. See Sax, supra note 88, at 5.
134. The various authorities governing the attorneys' position vis-A-vis the I.R.S. are as
follows: 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976) authorizing the Treasury Department to issue rules and
regulations governing practice before the I.R.S., Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-.91 (1983)
containing the Department's authorized rules for practice; and A.B.A. Commission on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965) setting forth the ethical relationship
existing between the attorneys and IRS.
135. 45 C.F.R. 58594 (Sept. 4, 1980). The Txeasury General Counsel indicated four general types of tax opinions with which the Treasury was concerned:
(1) Intentionally false or totally incompetent opinions;
(2) Disclaims knowledge of accuracy of facts opinions;
(3) Non- or hypothetical opinions; and
(4) Reasonable basis'opinions.
See N.Y. Tax supranote 131, at 205, 233-34, 292 (pt. 2); Sax, supra note 88, at 15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss5/6

14

Turner: Nonrecourse Liabilities as Tax Shelter Devices After Tufts: Elimi
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW PEVIEW

(Vol. XXXV

volves intricate schemes and even open violation of the law.1 36 The Commissioner stated, however, that the major tax legislation 1 37 of the 1980s had provided the IRS with new tools to combat these abusive shelters. He warned
investors1 38 and promoters' 39 to expect an aggressive litigation program involving criminal prosecution for fraud 40 as well as continued action in civil
matters.1 4 '

Nonrecourse Debt on Disposition:
Includibility in Amount Realized
In 1947, the Tax Court applied Crane to a mortgage foreclosure and ruled
the Crane doctrine would not be restricted to a sale situation. 4 2 After that,
the only questions remaining were how far the Crane doctrine would be extended and whether it would be limited to the property's fair market value
upon disposition. The first question was answered by 1983, when courts had
extended the doctrine to all manner of dispositions. As to the second question,
a line of court decisions and revenue rulings posited that Crane's footnote 37
permitted including nonrecourse debt in amount realized on property disposi4
tion, even when such debt exceeded the property's value. 3
136. Egger, supra note 8, at 55,505-06. The Commissioner characterized the movement by
the shelter industry as one of continual "leapfrogging"; that is, whenever the Service or
Congress has acted to stymie shelter growth, promoters and investors have found ways to
jump over the roadblocks. Id. at 55,506. Some recent case law shows the variety of areas and
schemes in which tax shelters have spread. E.g., United States v. Carruth, 699 F.2d 1017 (9th
Cir. 1983) (cattle breeding); United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982) (sale and
leaseback), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498, 1502 (1983); United States v. Drape, 668 F.2d 22
(Ist Cir. 1982) (coal); United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1981) (commodity
tax straddles), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
179 (3d Cir. 1981) (oil and gas "ponzi scheme", requiring investment by two limited partners to cover obligations of one); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (cable television systems); United States v. Crum, 529 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1976) (domesticated beavers).
137. For a discussion of this legislation, see supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
138. Egger, supra note 8, at 55,508. The investor is subject to penalties such as the
overvaluation penalty I.R.C. § 6659 (1982); a 50% penalty of the interest due on underpayment due to negligence, id. § 6653(a)(2); an underpayment penalty imposed on investors
in abusive shelter transactions, id. § 6701; increased interest on underpayment, id. § 6621(a);
and criminal prosecution for knowingly participating in a fraudulent scheme. Id. § 7206.
Egger, supra note 8, at 55,508.
139. Egger, supra note 8, at 55,508. Penalties for the promoter include civil sanctions,
I.R.C. § 6700 (1982); injunctions, id. § 7408; and criminal prosecutions. Id. § 7206(2).
140. Some recent criminal cases have involved overt tax fraud. E.g., United States v.
Carruth, 699 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983) (nonexistent transactions by promoter of over 100
limited partnerships in cattle breeding); United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982)
(backdated documentation by promoter in sale/ leaseback), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983);
United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1981) (illegal promoter commodity
straddle), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); United States v. Crum, 529 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1976) (promoter backdated purchase contract).
141. See Egger, supra note 8, at 55,507-08.
142. Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 323-25 (1947). See also Woodsam
Assoc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952); Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
970, 981 (1980).
143. See Townsend, Footnote 37 of Crane: What is the Nature of the Income?, 4 RIv.
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IniWodsariz Assocg. v. Commifsidner, 44 the Tax Court first dealt with'a
taxpayer's argument that under Crane, the amount realized on disposition
was limited to the property's value. 45 That case involved a mortgage foreclosure,48 but unlike Mrs. Crane, the taxpayer received no "boot" in the
transfer. 4 The court stated that even if Crane's footnote 37 provided an exception to the debt's includibility, that exception would not be available to
this taxpayer. 48 In dictum, however, the court indicated it was not persuaded
Crane intended any exception for cases in which the nonrecourse debt exceeded the property's fair market value. 49 In Revenue Rulings 76-111250 and
78-164,1" the IRS adopted the Woodsam dictum in ruling that a transfer of
property in cancellation of indebtedness' 52 and a voluntary conveyance of real
property to a mortgagee 53 require full inclusion in amount realized of amount
of debt exceeding the property's value.
The issue concerning a fair market value exception to Crane was again
raised in Millar v. Commissioner.254 The Third Circuit rejected the taxpayer's
argument, and noted Crane's footnote 37 was just "a postulate of hypothetical
observation."'9 5 The court, however, refused to rule out a possible exception
and stated its holding was limited to the facts.' 5 The Tax Court nonetheless
used Millar's dictum in Tufts v. Commissioner,57 and Estate of Delman v.
Commissioner-8 to reject taxpayer's arguments that Crane provided an exception to the extent debt exceeds value.
NonrecourseDebt on Acquisition:
Includibility in Basis
Having long ago lost its attack on the inclusion of nonrecouse debt in basis
TAX. INDrv. 128, 143-44 (1980); Comment, Crane's Footnote 37 Gets the Boot, 11 SETON HALL
679, 683-87 (1981).
144. 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
145. Id. at 635-55. See also Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 682, 688-89
(1943) (pre-Cranecase).
146. 16 T.C. at 655.
147. Id. Boot is an amount received over and above the mere transfer of the property.
In Crane the taxpayer received $3,000 in the exchange. 331 U.. at 3.
148. 16 T.C. at 655.
149. Id. Taxpayer also unsuccessfully raised the argument on appeal. The Second
Circuit noted that Crane applied whether the loan was equal to or less than the value of
the property, and the fact the taxpayer did not receive boot was no proof that the value was
less than the outstanding loan. 198 F.2d at 359.
150. 1976-1 C.B. 214.
151. 1978-1 C.B. 264.
152. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. at 215.
153. Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. at 264-65.
154. 577 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir.), aff'g on this issue, 72 T.C. 756 (1977), cert. denied, 439
US. 1046 (1978).
155. Id. at 215.
"156. -Id. at 216.
157. 70 T.C. 756, 764-66 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd; 103-S. Ct. 1826
(1983).
158. 73 T.C. 15,28-30 (1979).
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when property is purchased, 159 the IRS relied upon other weapons to eliminate
the use of nonrecourse debt in tax shelters. By the time Tufts was decided, a
multi-directed strategy of attack had apparently been established. Criminal
prosecutions were a recognized sanction for flagrant abuse.160 The newly enacted shelter promoter penalty 6" and injunction provisions 6 2 provided the
IRS with additional weapons. Finally, the Commissioner had developed four
interrelated arguments against the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis: at
risk rules, addition to tax for overvaluing assets, the contingent liability defense, and the fair market value defense.
The Commissioner has communicated his views on the at risk provisions
primarily by publishing revenue rulings and proposed regulations.162 In 1979,
the Commissioner proposed an extensive set of regulations for guidance in the
application of the at risk legislation.164 Additionally, since 1977, the IRS has
issued annually approximately two revenue rulings aimed at the at risk limitation deductions and related issues.' 65 These rulings convey the IRS's position
on tax shelter promoted benefits. 66
Property overvaluation has been increasingly used by wily promoters to
circumvent the tax shelter obstacles created by Congress and the IRS.167 To
frustrate such overvaluation, in 1981 Congress enacted ERTA section 6659168
159. See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 840 (1960), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
160. E.g., United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982) (backdating of documents), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); In re United States of America, (CCH) 83-1
U.S.T.C. 19358 (1983) (filing of false and fraudulent partnership returns under I.R.C.
§ 7206(2)). See Egger, supra note 8, at 55,508 (continued criminal prosecutions should aid in
directly attacking current shelter problems).
161. I.R.C. § 6700(a) (1982).
162. Id. § 7408. Egger, supra note 8, at 55,508. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchinson,
(P-H) 51 A.F.T.R.2d 1131 (S.D. Cal. 1983). For a discussion of the new statutes see supra
notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
163. Cf. Peters v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1158, 1162-63 (1981). See Zobel & Shore, The
IRS Crackdown On Valuation Abuses: How Far Does It Go; And What Does It Portend?, 52
J. TAX'N 276, 277 (1980).
164. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.465-1 to -95.44, Fed. Reg. 32235 (1979). The proposed regulations
are authorized pursuant to I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(C) (1982). See generally Hewitt & Pennell,
How At-Risk Proposals Deal with Encumbered Property, Suspended Losses, Depositions, 52
J. TAX'N 44 (1980); Hewitt & Pennell, Working with the Proposed At-Risk Regs: Needed
Clarification,Unresolved Problems,51 J. TAX'N 342 (1979).
165. Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul. 82-123, 1982-1 C.B. 82; Rev. Rul. 81-283,
1981-2 C.B. 115; Rev. Rul. 80-327, 1980-2 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 80-72, 1980-1 C.B. 109; Rev. Rul.
79-255, 1979-2 C.B. 17; Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 78-413, 1978-2 C.B. 167;
Rev. Rul. 78-412, 1978-2 C.B. 166; Rev. Rul. 78-175, 1978-1 C.B. 144; Rev. Rul. 77-397, 1977-2
C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 77-398, 1977-2 C.B. 179.
166. Sax, supra note 88, at 11-12. Recent developments indicate the IRS's interest in the
at risk area has not waned. The IRS has developed a new Form 6198 for computing deductible loss from at risk activities for use in taxable years beginning in 1983. I.R. 83-66
(Apr. 18, 1983).
167. Egger, supra note 8, at 55,505.
168. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 722(a), 95 Stat. 341 (1981). Section 6659 only applies to income,
not any other tax, such as estate tax. It was not targeted specifically at tax shelters but at
property valuation disputes in general. It does apply, however, to limited partnership tax
shelters. See Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul. 82-37, 1982-1 C.B. 214.
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which imposed a penalty for understating income tax due to property overvaluation. 169 The understatement must be at least $1,000170 and the property
must have been acquired within five years as of the dose of the tax year. 71 The
Commissioner has ruled the penalty applies to individual partners when the
overvaluation was made by the partnership on the partnership return, 72 and
73
to tax shelter programs in which nonrecourse debt is used.
In addition to the at risk provisions and the overvaluation penalty, the
Commissioner has employed the contingent liability and fair market value
defenses in opposing the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis. Confusion
exists between these defenses and their relationship to nonrecourse debt. 174 In
two post-Crane cases, the Tax Court refined the contingent liability defense
which provides that a nonrecourse obligation cannot be included in basis if it
is too speculative. 75 These cases established that the contingent liability defense does not apply when the amount of the nonrecourse obligation is fixed
and the only contingency is whether the payment will be made or the mortgage
foreclosed.
In Manuel D. Mayerson, 76 the taxpayer financed a real estate purchase
with a nonrecourse purchase-money note. 77 The purchase agreement provided
that the purchase price would be reduced if the obligation was paid off within
the first two years.178 The Commissioner argued this potential price reduction
made the note too contingent to be included in basis. 179 The Tax Court ruled
to the contrary, considering the reduction a "bonus discount" which did not
make the purchase price indefinite. 0o The court noted that in order to discharge the lien, the taxpayer would have to pay the then-fixed amount; therefore, the obligation was not contingent or indefinite.' 8 '
The second case, David F. Bolger,18 2 involved corporations formed with
169. I.R.C. § 6659(a) (1982).
170. Id. § 6659(d).
171. Id. § 6659(c)(2). The statute provides for the penalty's waiver upon a good faith
showing of a reasonable basis for the valuation. Id. § 6659(e).
172. Rev. Rul. 82-37, 1982-1 C.B. 214.
173. Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-1 C.B. 100.
174. See Rev. Rul. 81-262, 1981-2 C.B. 164, 165 (taxpayer unable to show property had
fair market value equal to the amount of the note, thus the note deemed a contingent obligation); Del Cotto, supra note 33, at 80-82 ("[e]merging from [the] cases is a rule of retrospective
analysis rather than a reasoned approach to the problem of contingent obligations" and recourse debt); Federal Tax Treatment, supra note 5, at 1514-24 (nonrecourse liabilities are
contingent in nature).
175. Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd,
637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981). For an argument that nonrecourse liabilities by their very
nature are contingent and never should be included in basis, see Note, supra note 5, at
1514-24. See also Del Cotto, supra note 33, at 79-81.
176. 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
177. Id. at 342.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 353.
180. Id.at 354.
181. Id. at 353-54. For a criticism of the Tax Court's analysis of the nonrecourse liability in Mayerson, see Del Cotto, supra note 33, at 71-82.
182. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
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nominal capitalization for the single purpose of acquiring title to depreciable
properties. By acquiring long term leases and issuing the corporations' own
negotiable promissory notes, the corporations obtained maximum financing
183
while avoiding state law restrictions on loans to the individual shareholders.
The corporations then sold the properties subject to the mortgages to their
respective taxpayer/shareholders for nominal consideration18 4 The shareholders thus became the alleged owners of the properties for allowable depreciation
but personal liability was linited.
The Commissioner denied the taxpayers' claimed depreciation partly on
the grounds that the nonrecourse debt should be considered contingent and
not includible in basis. 185 The Commissioner argued that the likelihood the
taxpayers would be required to make any mortgage payments was so speculative that each loan should not be considered part of the acquisition cost.' 88
The Tax Court rejected this argument declaring that the contingent liability
defense applies when the underlying obligations "by their terms" are contingent.1' The court distinguished cases such as Mayerson and Bolger where
the obligation is fixed, and the only speculative fact is whether payments will
1 88
be made or the mortgage foreclosed.
Because the IRS considers valuation the "prime consideration" in separating "good" from "abusive" tax shelters,8 9 it is not surprising that the fair
market value defense has moved to the core of the IRS's anti-tax shelter campaign. The contingent liability and fair market value defenses have become
the primary judicial weapons used by the Commissioner against nonrecourse
debt which is outside of the at risk rules. In fact, the combined defenses have
become a two-pronged threshold test in which taxpayers bear the burden of
proof in arguing for the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis. 190
Revenue Ruling 82-225191 epitomizes the relationship between the IRS's
various arguments and perhaps best illustrates the Service's overall strategy for
dealing with nonrecourse loans. The ruling involved a tax shelter promotion
183.

Id. at 761-62.

184. Id. at 763.
185. Id. at 771. The Commissioner also argued unsuccessfully that the corporations
should be considered shams and not separate entities for tax purposes, id. at 766-67, and that
if the corporations were treated as separate entities, they and not the taxpayers were entitled
to the depreciation deductions. Id. at 767-69. The Commissioner also asserted that the nonrecourse note should not be considered part of the cost basis notwithstanding its potential
contingent nature. Id. at 770. For a discussion of a possible argument in Bolger that the
leases may have divested the single-purpose corporations of any depreciable interest which
to pass to the shareholders, see Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, 349-50 (1980), a/I'd,
671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982).
186. 59 T.C. at 771.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Handbook, supra note 125, § 366(1).
190. E.g., Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
a/p"d, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981); Mahoney v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1181-5312,
at 81-6131, -6139 (Ct. C1. 1981); Rev. Rul. 81-262, 1981-2 C.B. 164; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1
C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
191. 1982-2 C.B. 100.
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of a video program. The investors' cost was 17,000x dollars, 1,300x payable by
cash down and the balance by alleged recourse note. The note, however, was
convertible to a nonrecourse obligation if certain events occurred.192 The ruling concluded that the note's initial recourse nature was designed solely to
circumvent the at risk limitations. The note would thus be treated initially as
a nonrecourse loan. 9 3 Although the ruling was primarily directed at the at
risk rules, it also stated that unless the value of the property purchased by each
investor approximated the note's amount it could not be included in basis, and
no interest deduction would be allowable. 94 The ruling additionally declared
that the section 6659 overvaluation penalty might apply.195
THE: Tufts DECISION AND ITS TAX SHELTER

RAMIFICATIONS

90

In Commissioner v. Tufts,' taxpayers formed a general partnership to
construct a large apartment complex.2 97 None of the partners contributed any
capital upon entering the partnership. 98 To finance the construction, the
partnership obtained a nonrecourse loan of $1,851,500 from a savings and loan
association in exchange for a note and deed of trust covering the property. 199
The project was completed in 1971, and the depreciation deductions on the
complex were passed through to the partners for the taxable years 1971 and
1972.200 Because of adverse economic conditions, the rental income from the
apartment was insufficient to make note payments in August, 1972.201 Facing
possible foreclosure, the partners sold their interest to a buyer who paid the
202
sales expense and took the property subject to the nonrecourse encumbrance.
At the time of sale, the complex's adjusted basis reduced for depreciation
was $1,455,740, and its fair market value was $1,400,000. 203 The principal
amount on the note remained $1,851,500. 20 In reporting the sale for tax purposes, the partners claimed a loss of $55,740, the difference between the property's fair market value and adjusted basis. 20 5 The Commissioner held taxpayers actually had a gain of approximately $400,000, the difference between
the remaining unpaid balance of the note and adjusted basis.206
On petition to the Tax Court, the partners argued that under Crane's footnote 37 the amount realized on the sale was limited to the property's fair
192. Id.
193. Id. at 101.
194. See id. This statement was based on Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
195. 1982-2 C.B. at 101.
196. 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
197. Id. at 1828.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1829. Partners take into account income and losses of the partnership in their
individual capacities, I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a) (1982).
201. 103 S. Ct. at 1829.
202. Id.
203.

Id. at 1829.

204. See id. n.2.

205. Id. n.1.
206. Id. n.2.
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market value.20 The Tax Court instead agreed with the Commissioner that
fair market value was immaterial to the determination and ruled the Crane
doctrine required including the full balance of nonrecourse debt in amount
realized. 208 Reversing the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit expressly disagreed
with the Tax Court's analysis of Crane and questioned the theoretical under2 °9

pinnings of Crane itself.

On certiorari,210 the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and extended
the Crane doctrine to require including a nonrecourse mortgage in amount
realized when the mortgage exceeds the value of the property transferred..211
The Court reasoned that this conclusion followed from Crane's treatment of a
nonrecourse mortgage as a true loan.212 When the taxpayers sold the property
subject to the mortgage, it was analogous to receiving cash borrowed by the
buyer from the mortgagee on a nonrecourse basis and using that cash to pay
off their mortgage. 213 The Court thus deemed proper the sellers' full inclusion
214
of nonrecourse debt in amount realized.

In simply equating nonrecourse debt with recourse debt for realization
purposes, the Tufts court eliminated prior speculation that the Crane doctrine
was grounded on an "economic benefit theory." 215 A property owner is not
207. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 763-64 (1978).
208. Id. at 763. The Tax Court relied upon Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), in which the Third Circuit had refused to limit
amount realized to value on facts similar to Tufts. 70 T.C. at 767.
209. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1063 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1826
(1982). For a fuller discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see Comment, The Resurrection
of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575, 591-97 (1981); Note, Footnote Thirty-Seven
Exception of Crane, 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 162, 171-78 (1982).
210. The Commissioner's petition to the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing was denied. Commissioner's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Commissioner v. Tufts, 651 F.2d 1058 (1983), reprinted in 15 BNA Law Reprints, Tax Series, No. 4 at 1, 7 (1982/83 Term) [hereinafter cited as Cert. Petition]. The
Commissioner grounded the petition on three arguments: (1) the circuit court's holding
conflicted with that of the Third Circuit in Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), Cert. Petition, supra at 11-13; (2) both the relevant Code
provisions (I.R.C. §§ 1001(b), 1011(a), 1012, 1016) (1976)) and the teaching of Crane pertaining to basis, dictated equivalent treatment between basis and amount realized, Cert. Petition,
supra at 13-23; and (3) Congress in discussing the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
had recognized inclusion of full nonrecourse debt in amount realized upon dispositions. Id.
at 23-24.
211. 103 S. Ct. at 1831.
212. Id. at 1831. Viewed as a loan, the proceeds of the nonrecourse mortgage did not
constitute income, since the mortgage was accompanied by a corresponding obligation to
repay.Id.
213. Id. at 1834.
214. Id.
215. Other theories which had evolved to explain the Crane decision include the tax
benefit theory and the discharge of indebtedness theory. The tax benefit theory developed
from Crane's "double deduction" that because the taxpayer had previously taken depreciation deductions from the property's total value, allowing her to escape inclusion of the non-

recourse debt in amount realized would be tantamount to giving her a double deduction on
the same loss. Id. The tax benefit theory essentially provided that the taxpayer who had

previously enjoyed the benefit of large tax deductions, without placing his own assets at risk,
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personally liable for the nonrecourse mortgage, but he nevertheless has a
strong incentive to make the payments and thereby avoid foreclosure on his
property.210 Many commentators explained Crane's inclusion of nonrecourse
debt in amount realized as a recognition of the economic relief afforded a taxpayer who sells property subject to an outstanding nonrecourse mortgage.217
This theory would have limited the amount realized upon disposition to the
property's value. Otherwise, when the nonrecourse debt exceeded the prophad, by taking those deductions, improved his economic position, thus realizing gain. 651
F.2d at 1060. Because this theory appeared to match tax benefits and deductions, confusion
arose as to whether the "tax benefit" concept of Crane was the same as the traditional tax
benefit rule. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 7, at 282; Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions
of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems
of Basis, 26 BUffALo L. R.v. 219, 323-24 (1977); Townsend, supra note 143, at 151-53. Compare Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 50 n.3 (1979) (tax benefit rule is
"theoretically" distinct from application of Crane, to nonrecourse debt) with Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983)
(taxpayer defense to Crane by application of tax benefit rule) [and] Townsend, supra note
143, at 151-53 (Estate of Delman decision rested on tax benefit notions, as part of tax benefit
rule). The Tax Benefit Rule is a judicially developed principle (with limited congressional
sanction, I.R.C. § 111 (1982)), which attempts to incorporate some degree of transactional
equivalence threatened by the annual accounting requirement of the Code, id. § 446(a), in
which the taxpayer receives a benefit for a deduction in one taxable year, which because of
some additional benefit received in a subsequent year requires income inclusion in the latter
year. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1142-44 (1983). For a discussion
of the Tax Benefit Rule, see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
265 (1978).
The discharge of indebtedness theory attempted to relate Crane to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). Kirby Lumber noted that,
upon discharge of debt, a taxpayer no longer must satisfy that obligation with cash or other
assets, and this indirect freeing of assets gives rise to income. Id. at 3. Some commentators
believed this rationale was or should be the foundation for Crane. E.g., Del Cotto, supra
note 33, at 87; Kaster, Tax Solutions and SEC Problems for Shaky Real Estate Shelters, 44
J. TAx'N 146, 147 (1976); Townsend, supra note 143, at 145-51. For a discussion of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine, see Bittker & Thompson, Income from the Discharge of
Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. R.v. 1159
(1978); Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. RXv. 225 (1959).
216. As the Crane court noted, "an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than
that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations." 331 U.S. at 14.
217. E.g., Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1965); Commissioner
v. Fortree Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1954). The Economic Benefit Theory
rested upon the reasoning of Cranethat:
[A] mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the property subject to
mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount of
mortgage as well as the boot.... [A]n owner of property, mortgaged at a figure
than that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of
mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he transfers subject to
mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were
charged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.

the
the
less
the
the
dis-

831 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted). See Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1061-62; Federal Tax Treatment,
supra note 5, at 1500-02.
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erty's value, the taxpayer's incentive to make payments and avoid foreclosure
8

would be eliminated.21

Consistent with Crane's basic precept of symmetry between depreciable
basis and amount realized 2 '1 the Tufts court also equated nonrecourse and
recourse debt in computing basis. 220 The basis for a purchased asset is its cost

to the taxpayer. 221 When a taxpayer purchases an asset with recourse loan
proceeds, he includes the loan amount in determining the asset's cost because
he has an obligation to repay the loan.222 The Tufts court correspondingly
held that when nonrecourse loan proceeds are applied toward an asset's purchase, that loan amount also constitutes part of the asset's cost or basis. 223
Because fair market value is irrelevant in ascertaining the cost of property to a
taxpayer who purchases with cash or a recourse loan, it is likewise irrelevant
224
when property is purchased with proceeds of a nonrecourse loan.
In footnote 5, the Tufts court acknowledged that Crane could have distinguished nonrecourse debt as a "contingent liability" and thus excluded it
from basis on the ground that it was not part of the taxpayer's investment, but
simply a joint investment by the taxpayer and mortgagee. 225 The Court em-

phasized, however, that this approach was not adopted in Crane or applied in
Tufts. 226 Because Crane treated nonrecourse mortgage as a true loan, a taxpayer's basis includes the full amount of nonrecourse debt, regardless of its
contingent nature or whether it exceeds the property's fair market value.227
As in Crane, the Commissioner initiated and won Tufts on the revenueproducing contention that nonrecourse debt should be included in amount
realized. Much to the Commissioner's chagrin, the symmetrical treatment of
basis and amount realized also dictated that nonrecourse debt be included in
depreciable basis. Consequently, Tufts' principal impact may be to foster the
228
booming tax shelter industry initiated by Crane.

Overthrow of the Contingent Liability and
FairMarket Value Defenses
In Tufts, the Commissioner contended that the nonrecourse mortgage
should be included in amount realized, 229 and the established defenses to in218. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d at 1962; Bittker, supra note 7, at 281; Del Cotto,
supra note 33, at 85.
219. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. at 12.
220. 103 S. Ct. at 1831-82.
221. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 102 (1948); I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
222. See 108 S. Ct. at 1831-32.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1831-32 n.5.
226. Id. The Court declined to express views whether such a contingent liability approach would be acceptable or preferable, it only noted that Crane was inconsistent with
such an approach. Id.
227. Id. at 1831-32.
228. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
229. Brief for Petitioner, Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983), reprinted in 15
BNA Law Reprints, Tax Series, No. 4 at 1,61-62 (1982/83 Term).
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cludibility in basis should be left intact. 23 0 The taxpayer countered that the
Commissioner's position would result in an asymmetrical treatment of basis
and amount realized: the seller would be taxed on the full amount of nonrecourse debt and yet the buyer would receive a cost basis of only the property's
fair market value. 231 In response, the IRS agreed that the buyer's cost basis
would equal the fair market value. The Commissioner assured the Court that
symmetry would nevertheless be maintained because only the amount of debt
includible in basis would have to be reported in amount realized on disposition.232

At first blush, the IRS's argument appears sound because Crane's symmetry
requirement is seemingly met. However, once either the fair market value or
contingent liability defense is applied, questions arise as to how much, if any,
of the norecourse debt should be included in the buyer's basis and when it
should be included. Because courts have adopted various answers to these
questions, a taxpayer could never be certain of his property's depreciable basis.
For example, in Estate of Franklin,23 3 the court applied the fair market
value defense to deny any depreciation or interest deductions attributable to
nourecourse debt in excess of the property's value. 234 The court expressly declined to decide the impact on basis in subsequent years if the property value
increased and revealed a clear equity interest.23 5 The court suggested that
depreciable basis may be deemed to commence at the date the increments to
the purchaser's equity commenced. 238 The court did not explain the tax consequences if the equity interest thereafter began to fall due to a decrease in the
property value.
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. United States, 23 7 the
Court of Claims offered a different solution to the problem of fluctuating basis.
The court adopted the contingent liability defense and denied the taxpayer's
depreciation deductions. 238 As the taxpayer made actual payments for the
23 9
property, the basis would be "built up... year-by-year."
Yet another means of calculating basis was adopted in Gibson Products Co.
230. Id. at 65 n.16.
231. Brief for Respondents, Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983), reprinted in
15 BNA Law Reprints, Tax Series, No. 4 at 1, 148-49 (1982/83 Term).
232. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983), reprinted
in 15 BNA Law Reprints, Tax Series, No. 4 (1982/83 Term) at 1, 162-63. The IRS based this
assertion on Treas. Reg. § 1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
233. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
234. Id. at 1048-49.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1049 n.5. The court in Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982), also
evaded the problem of fluctuating basis associated with the fair market value defense. That

court refused to permit depredation deductions because the property's fair market value did
not equal the purchase price including nonrecourse debt. Id. at 498-99. In response to the
taxpayer's concern regarding symmetry, the court declared that because the loan was not
included in basis, "absent a change in circumstances," it would not be included in amount

realized upon disposition.
237. 505 F.2d 166 (Ct.Cl. 1974).
238. Id. at 1269-71.
239. Id. at 1270.
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v. United States.240 The district court stated that the fair market value defense
precluded even increasing basis for the portion of nonrecourse debt up to the
property's fair market value.241 In affirming the district court's result based on
the grounds that the debt was not a true loan, 242 the Fifth Circuit approved
the district court's interpretation of the fair market value defense. 243 Interestingly, the IRS has interpreted the circuit court's decision as standing for the
proposition that when nonrecourse debt exceeds the property's value, it is
includible in basis to the extent of the value. Crane's "functional relation"
concept is maintained by only including the amount originally included in
basis in the amount realized on disposition.44

If Tufts' facts are applied to these various approaches to excess nonrecourse
debt, it becomes clear a taxpayer would never know what his property's depreciable basis may be. In Tufts, the third party purchased depreciable property valued at $1,400,000 for $250 cash, taking subject to the nonrecourse
mortgage of $1,851,500.245 Under Tufts apparent holding, the taxpayer would
have a cost basis of $1,851,750, including the cash and mortgage, for depreciation purposes. The Commissioner took the position in his reply brief that the
basis would be $1,400,000, the property's fair market value. However, where
the property's value had not been previously stipulated, a purchaser could not
be certain of the rule a court would apply. Under Estate of Franklin, the court
might deny any depreciable basis for the debt until the new property owner
acquired equity246 The Denver & Rio Grande rule might give him an initial
basis of $250 for his cash contribution and increase the basis with each cash
payment on the debt.2 47 The Gibson Products Co. decision might also disregard
2 48
the entire debt even up to the property value.
240. 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
241. Id. at 1117 n.10. The district court held that both the contingent liability and fair
market value defenses required excluding the nonrecourse loan from basis. Id. at 1115.
242. Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1981).
243. Id. at 1045 n.8.
244. Cert. Petition, supra note 210, at 18 n.9; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 229, at 65
n.16.
The IRS combines the two defenses in a confusing manner in its tax shelter handbook.
If the nonrecourse loan amount "greatly exceeds" the property's value, then the entire loan
amount is "contingent" and not includible in basis, if the loan is "not contingent," however,
an amount equal to the value of the property is includible in basis. Handbook, supra note
125, § 3(18)0(2). But cf. Rev. Rul. 68-362, 1968-2 C.B. 334 (assuming or taking property subject to a mortgage, in connection with the acquisition of property to which it relates, entitles
purchaser to include amount of mortgage in basis "as though the purchaser had paid cash
in the amount of the mortgage," citing Crane).
245. 103 S. Ct. at 1828.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39. The fact that some of these decisions did
not involve real property is of no consequence to the criticism of the Commissioner's reply
argument, since the defenses of Contingent Liability and Fair Market Value have been applied to various types of properties without discrimination. See Fox v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.
972, 1019-23 (1983).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 240-44. Moreover, on audit, the basis might depend on whether the auditor viewed a $400,000 variance in excess debt as "greatly" exceeding
value. See supra note 244.
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Because a taxpayer's basis cannot be adequately determined when the fair
market value or contingent liability defense is applied, elimination of these
defenses appears to be a necessary corollary to Crane's rule of symmetry between basis and amount realized. Tufts' holding that a nonrecourse mortgage
must be treated as a true loan in computing both basis and amount realized,
regardless of fair market value, is thus laudably consistent with Crane. In fact,
a principal reason the Crane court held nonrecourse debt includible in basis
was to avoid the accounting burden associated with recognizing a fluctuating
basis. 24 9 As both Estate of Franklin and Denver & Rio Grande reveal, such a
basis concept would require basis to be changed with each mortgage payment,
and would consequently grant the mortgagor control over the timing of his
depreciation allowances. Not only would this result entail great administrative
problems, it would also conflict with depreciation principles, since the purpose
of depreciation deductions is to account for the consequences of time and use
on a taxpayer's capital assets. 2 50
Possible Assault on Tax Shelters NotwithstandingTufts
If indeed Tufts has destroyed the contingent liability and fair market value
defenses, 251 new means of attacking nonrecourse debt as a taxsheltering device
will have to surface.2 5 2 The test apparently established in Tufts treats recourse
and nonrecourse liabilities alike. Thus a nonrecourse debt, regardless of its
amount, the property's fair market value or the terms of payment, is includible
in basis. 252 The only arguments available to the Commissioner would be to
249. 331 U.S. at 10.
250. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943).
251. In at least two recent cases, petitions for certiorari were filed after the fair market
defense was successfully invoked by the Commissioner on appeal but were denied by the
Supreme Court. CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2453 (1983); Brountas v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 152, 157-58 (lst Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2453 (1983).
252. Tufts may have also undermined the effectiveness of ERTA's overvaluation penalty,
I.R.C. § 6659, as a means of attacking nonrecourse debt. The statute indicates that a valuation overstatement of adjusted basis occurs when the adjusted basis claimed on the return
exceeds 150% of the amount determined to be correct. Id. § 6659(c)(1). Under the Tufts
rationale, however, the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis is totaly unrelated to the
property's value. An inflated nonrecourse note that bears no conceivable connection to the
property's value could consequently be includible in basis without violating the 150% test,
thus frustrating the penalty provision. If this is the case, only § 465 of the original four
defenses to nonrecourse debt remains available to the Commissioner after Tufts. See supra
text accompanying note 163.
253. The Supreme Court stated that the Commissioner in Crane had chosen to accord
nonrecourse debt the same treatment as recourse debt. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at
1831. Nonrecourse debt differs from recourse debt only in that the mortgagee's remedy for
breach is limited to foreclosing on the securing property. This limited remedy does not
alter the nature of the obligation, but simply shifts to the mortgagee the risk of loss caused
by declining property value. Id. at 1833. Cf. Rev. Rul. 95, 1953-1 C.B. 162 (whether mortgage
indebtedness is assumed or property taken subject to indebtedness, for purposes of depreciation and gain or loss upon sale or disposition, "the mortgage indebtedness is treated in the
same manner as cash paid," citing Crane).
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challenge whether a particular nonrecourse debt is in fact debt, and if so,
whether grounds exist for denying loss deductions attributable to the debt.
When particularly flagrant abuses of nonrecourse debt occur, the Commissioner might argue that tax policy precludes treating the nonrecourse
liability as debt. In Hager v. Commissioner,254 the court broached the possibility that if a large nonrecourse loan is used to purchase property, but no equity
interest is obtained, the sale might be considered a sham and disregarded for
federal tax purposes. 255 Because the cases involving sham transactions were or
could have been decided under the contingent liability or fair market value
defenses, 256 however, the contours of this separate defense are ill-defined. Of
particular difficulty is articulating factors that indicate a transaction is actually
a "sham." Since Tufts declared nonrecourse debt equivalent to recourse debt
merely looking to the excess
and unrelated to the property's fair market2 value,
57
liability over value would seem insufficient.
Another approach for attacking the validity of nonrecourse debt as debt is
similar to a debt/equity analysis. This approach was suggested in Gibson
2 58
Products Co. v. United States. That case applied both the contingent liabil259
to deny deductions attributable to nonity and fair market value defenses
of the transaction, the district court
economics
the
of
recourse debt. In light
"was not in fact a debt, but an
debt
the
conclude
noted that it could also
260
stance regarding alleged nonthis
taken
also
has
The IRS
equity interest."
2 61
partnerships.
limited
to
recourse loans
To limit losses, the Commissioner has the clout of the at risk rules to
262
Additionally, the Commissioner can use
combat the covered activities.
6
Code section 446(b) to limit loss deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt.2 3

This section empowers the Commissioner to deny a present deduction if he
264
The Supreme Court has inbelieves it does not clearly reflect income.

254. 76 T.C. 759 (1981).
255. Id. at 775 n.8. Cf. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir.
1976) (one argument by Commissioner was that acquisition of property was a "sham"). The
Commissioner has used Hager's suggested argument in subsequent cases. E.g., Gibson Prod.
Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1981); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
471, 499 n.5 (1982). See also Rev. Rul. 78-30, 1978-1 C.B. 133; Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B.
130, providing that guarantor, not maker, of nonrecourse loan is entitled to deductions.
256. See cases cited supra note 255.
257. E.g., Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1981).
258. 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1981). See also Backar v. Western States Producing Co., 547 F.2d 876, 880 n.3 (5th Cir.
1977).
259. 460 F. Supp. at 1115.
260. Id. at 1119.
261.

Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 C.B. 394; Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200.

262. See supra notes 87-93, 162-66 and accompanying text.
263. I.R.C. § 446(b) provides: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by
the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly
reflect income."
264. Treas. Reg. § 1A46-1(a)(2) (1957).
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terpreted section 446(b) as giving the Commissioner broad discretion to set
aside a taxpayer's method of accounting concerning any item of income or
deduction not reflecting income.265 The Commissioner is increasingly utilizing
that section to combat tax shelter abuse, thus laying the groundwork for a
major incursion into excessive nonrecourse debt and tax shelters. 26 Section
27
446(b) has been successfully used to deny deductions for prepaid interest, 6
prepaid cattle feed,2 68 and advance fees to a general partner. 269 Because courts
have ruled that section 446(b) applies at the partnership level involving partnership property,2 70 a direct threat to depreciation and nonrecourse debt exists.
Section 446(b) has also been applied to deny depreciation deductions not tied
to income flow.2 7 ' Sufficient grounds have thus been provided for the position

that partnership depredation deductions attributable to excessive nonrecourse
debt not clearly reflect property income.
CONCLUSION

The footnote 37 controversy has finally been resolved by the Tufts decision.
All the grand conjecture and debate has terminated after three and a half
decades with a fizzle: a nonrecourse loan is simply a loan, fully includible in
amount realized regardless of the fair market value of the securing property.
The Commissioner's two major weapons against the tax shelter industry and
nonrecourse debt, the fair market value and contingent liability defenses appear to have received a death blow from Tufts. The elimination of these defenses will not halt the Commissioner's attack but only refocus it. As he did
with the at risk rules, the Commissioner may seek Congressional assistance.
The Tufts court itself hinted that Congress might statutorily eliminate the
equivalence between recourse and nonrecourse debt.2 72 In the meantime, the
Commissioner may begin to argue that a given transaction involving nonrecourse debt does not involve true debt. Finally, the Commissioner may turn

265. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979). See RCA Corp v.
United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1958 (1983).
266.

See Palen, Tax Shelters After the St. Patrick's Day Massacre: What's Out; What's

Left, 53 J. TAX'N 322, 323-24 (1980). See also Handbook, supra note 125, at §§ 200, 300, 500,
600.
267. E.g., Ferrill v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d 261, 265 (3d Cir. 1982); Duffy v. United
States, 690 F.2d 889, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
268. E.g., Dunn v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 991, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
269. E.g., Estate of Boyd v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 646, 667 (1981).
270. E.g., Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1103 (1979), af'd on other grounds,
650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981); Resnick v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 74, 81 (1976), aff'd per euriam,
555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf. Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 504-05 (1982)
(whether activity is trade or business determined at partnership level).
271. E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 78-199, 1978-1 C.B. 66; Rev. Rul.
78-30, 1978-1 C.B. 133. Cf. Rev. Rul. 78-30, 1978-1 C.B. 133; Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B.
130, providing that the guarantor, not the maker, is entitled to deductions on a nonrecourse
loan to be satisfied solely from earnings from property.
272. 103 S. Ct. at 1832 n.7.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss5/6

28

Turner: Nonrecourse Liabilities as Tax Shelter Devices After Tufts: Elimi
932

[Vol. XXXV

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

full attention to his discretionary ace-in-the-hole, section 446(b). Should that
occur, Tufts may yet become the Commissioner's victory.273
DANIEL

C.

TURNER

273. Since the Tufts decision courts have failed to properly address the impact of its
holding equating recourse and nonrecourse loans, or the possible elimination of the fair
market value or contingent liabilities defenses. In fact the courts have virtually ignored Tufts
in continuing to apply the defenses to overturn nonrecourse loans. E.g., Brannen v. Commissioner, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 579, 583 n.4 (l1th Cir. 1984) (Tufts not relevant regarding
includibility of nonrecourse loans in basis); Carolina, Clinclfield & Ohio Ry. v. Commissioner,
82 T.C. No. 68, at 3214-15 (1984) (Tufts not applicable to contingent liabilities); Rice's
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184, 196, 196 n.9 (1983) (Tufts limited by fair
market value defense); Flowers v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914, 943-44 n.44 (1983) (Tufts not
applicable to unreasonably and artificially inflated amount of nonrecourse indebtedness);
Webber v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. 32, 53 n.12 (1983) ("the applicability of [the fair market
value defense] to tax shelter transactions involving nonrecourse indebtedness has been held
by [the Tax Court] to be unaffected by [Tufts]").
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